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Abstract. This paper presents new results on the existence of Bayesian equilibria
in pure strategies of a specified functional form. These results broaden the scope
of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strategies. Ap-
plications include natural models of first-price and all-pay auctions not covered by
previous existence results. To illustrate the scope of our results, we present three
auctions: (i) a first-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and imperfect
substitutes; (ii) a first-price auction in which bidders’ payoffs have a very general
interdependence structure; and (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilib-
rium.
Keywords: Bayesian games, monotone strategies, pure-strategy equilibrium, auc-
tions.
1. Introduction
Equilibrium behavior in general Bayesian games is not well understood. While there
is an extensive literature on equilibrium existence, that literature imposes substantive
restrictions on the structure of the Bayesian game. In particular, previous existence
results require some version of the following assumptions:
(1) “weak quasi-supermodularity:” informally, the coordinates of a a player’s own
action vector need to be complementary; and
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(2) “weak single-crossing:” informally, a player’s incremental returns of actions
are nondecreasing in her types.
We show that pure-strategy equilibria exist under significantly more general condi-
tions, without impeding the analyst’s ability to describe the properties of the equi-
librium. The class of Bayesian games we cover includes games in which the players’
action vectors are substitutes, and players’ incremental returns of actions are not al-
ways increasing in their types. Despite the generality of these games, pure-strategy
equilibria are well-behaved, in strategies that belong to a particular class of inter-
est, such as the set of functions of bounded total variation, or functions of mixed
monotonicity.1
The approach we adopt in this paper is motivated by positive questions. The
goal is to develop a model that introduces new considerations to the analysis of
Bayesian games and provides useful (testable) predictions. In the context of auctions
in particular, we seek a convenient modeling tool for describing bidders’ behavior
in environments where weak quasi-supermodularity and weak single-crossing are too
strong or unlikely to be true. Providing a more comprehensive theoretical framework
for interpreting data has important implications for empirical and experimental re-
search on auctions. In experimental work, it is usually the case that the questions
of interest cannot be answered empirically until an internally consistent model of an
auction game is specified. Thus our result extends the kind of economic questions
that can be investigated using traditional experimental methods.2 Further, structural
econometric approaches to auctions have been mostly restricted to a limited class of
models, usually settings with one object in which the equilibrium bidding strategies
are monotone. There are few extensions to environments with multiple objects, with
most of the empirical literature focusing on the case of identical goods (multi-unit
auctions).3 One of the main hurdles to progress beyond these settings is the lack
of development of the theory. Thus extending the class of games for which we can
characterize pure-strategy equilibria is a necessary step towards new developments
in the empirical analysis of data generated by auctions. Finally, albeit beyond the
scope of the present paper, a more general equilibrium existence result is of interest
1Informally, functions of mixed monotonicity are those that are nondecreasing in some dimensions
of the player’s types and possibly nonincreasing in other dimensions.
2Kagel (1995) and Kagel and Levin (2015) are valuable surveys on the ongoing experimental work
on auctions.
3Athey and Haile (2007) provide an excellent survey of structural econometric approaches to auc-
tions.
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from the point of view of normative economics. By allowing for a richer strategic
environment, our result can lead to policy questions that have not been considered
before, such as how to auction strictly substitute goods.
To illustrate the scope of our main result, we study the equilibrium properties of
a series of first-price and all-pay auctions that had until now been beyond reach.
The applications to auctions we present here are parsimonious and intuitive. Their
simplicity is a consequence of the breadth and flexibility of our main result and a
reflection of how little we know about auctions outside the class of models satisfying
quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing. While these complementarity assumptions
are natural in some settings, there are many economic situations in which these
assumptions entail unreasonable restrictions. The three auctions we describe illustrate
ubiquitous economic environments in which the complementarity assumptions fail for
various natural reasons.
The first application is a first-price auction of multiple objects that are imperfect
substitutes from the bidders’ perspective, which is not covered by any other existence
result. More specifically, there are two objects being auctioned simultaneously, and
although players can place bids on both objects, they would prefer to buy only one of
them. In this case, the bidders’ valuations are strictly submodular, thus failing to be
(weakly) quasi-supermodular, as required by McAdams (2003). In fact, there is no
other result of existence of equilibrium that can be applied to Bayesian games in which
players have interdependent but strictly submodular payoff functions. Further, there
is no order on the bidders’ actions for which the best responses are closed with respect
to the pointwise supremum of the bids, thus the more general results of Reny (2011)
also cannot be applied.4 Our main result shows that this auction has an equilibrium
in pure strategies. Moreover, this equilibrium is not monotone.
The second application is an all-pay auction model in which bidders have one-
dimensional type and action spaces, interdependent valuations, and correlated types
in ways that may fail the monotone likelihood ratio property. Nevertheless, we are able
to show that, under a condition more general than the weak monotonicity condition
of Siegel (2014), this auction has an equilibrium in pure strategies that are of bounded
total variation. This application thus substantiates the assertion that our main result
extends the result in Athey (2001) to models that fail the (weak) single-crossing
property.
4To be more specific, there is no unique order on players’ actions consistent with the results of
Lemma C.18.
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The third application is a first-price auction in which bidders’ types are multidimen-
sional and their valuations are interdependent, although restricted to be of polynomial
form. Thus it shows that our main result extends the analysis of McAdams (2003)
and Reny (2011) when players have multidimensional type spaces, by allowing for
more general interdependence structures across the players’ payoffs. Perhaps more
importantly, since polynomial functions are dense in the set of measurable functions,
this auction demonstrates how our main result can be applied to show existence of
equilibrium in models that are very close to games in which players have arbitrary,
unrestricted payoff functions.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. To illustrate the suitability
of our result to auctions, Section 2 describes a very simple example of a first-price
auction of heterogeneous objects that are imperfect substitutes from the bidders’ per-
spective, for which we show existence of a Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies.
The mathematical framework, which concerns absolute retracts and ordered spaces,
is described in Section 3. The class of Bayesian games our result covers is described
formally in Section 4, where the main existence result is proved. Section 5 studies
additional auctions that illustrate the flexibility and scope of our result. Section 6
discusses sufficient conditions on the primitives of the game; these sufficient condi-
tions, albeit stronger, require no preparation or mathematical preliminaries. Section 7
explains how the main results in Athey (2001), McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011)
can be derived as a consequence of our result. The Appendix contains most proofs.
2. Example: auction of imperfect substitutes
To motivate the results in the present paper, we first give an example of a first-price
auction of heterogeneous objects that are imperfect substitutes. With substitute ob-
jects, the bidders’ valuations fail to be quasi-supermodular, as required by McAdams
(2003). More importantly, there is no order on the bidders’ actions for which the best
responses are closed with respect to the pointwise supremum of the bids, thus the
more general results of Reny (2011) cannot be applied. Further, there is no result
in the more specialized literature on auctions that can be applied. The literature
on existence of equilibrium in multi-object auctions is not well-developed, and most
theoretical results are for multi-unit auctions, in which the objects are identical. Few
results apply to cases in which the objects are heterogeneous and even less to cases
in which the objects are strongly substitutes. Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006) study
auctions for bus services in London. In their study, it may be cheaper to operate
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some routes if a nearby route is currently being served, so there may be complemen-
tarities between some contracts, but some bundles of contracts may be substitutes.
Their model is a sealed-bid discriminatory auction in which bidders submit bids on
bundles of objects. Baldwin and Klemperer (2019) analyze auctions in which bidders
may have purely-complements or purely-substitute preferences over indivisible goods,
and show existence of a competitive equilibrium. Their setting does not allow for
the objects to be imperfect substitutes. Palfrey (1983), Armstrong (2000), and Avery
and Hendershott (2000) study auctions of multiple, heterogeneous objects. But the
bidders’ valuation function in their models is additively separable, which is covered
by McAdams (2003) and Reny (2011). In our example, the objects are strongly sub-
stitutes, which implies that the bidders’ valuation function is strictly subadditive.
Our result shows that this auction has an equilibrium in pure strategies that are not
monotone.
There are two objects for sale, object A and object B, and N bidders. Each bidder i
receives a private signal ti = (tAi , tBi ) ∈ [0, 1]2. Bidder i’s signals are distributed
independently of other bidders’ signals, according to the density function fi : [0, 1]2 →
R+. After observing their signals, each bidder i submits a sealed bid bi = (bAi , bBi )
from a finite set of bids B ⊆ R2+. We assume that the set of bids B contains the zero
vector, that is, (0, 0) ∈ B.
If the realization of signals is t = (t1, . . . , tN) and bidder i wins subset S ⊆ {A,B}
of objects, then bidder i’s payoff is given by
vi(S, ti) = max
k∈S
tki ,
with the convention that if S = ∅, then maxk∈S tki = 0.5 Under this formulation,
winning both objects gives the bidders no higher payoff than winning only the object
they consider most valuable. Therefore the objects may be seen as substitutes, which
implies that vi fails any of the usual supermodularity conditions required by previous
existence results. In particular, best responses are not closed with respect to the
supremum. Further, there is no order on actions that will make the best responses
either closed with respect to the supremum or the infimum, which means that it is
not possible to show existence of equilibrium using the result of Reny (2011).
Given a vector b = (b1, . . . , bN) of bids of all bidders, each object k is awarded to
the bidder with the highest bid bki , who pays her bid. If there is a tie at the highest
5There is nothing essential about this particular functional form. This example can be extended to
more general subadditive payoff functions, as well as a larger number of objects.
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bid, then the object is awarded to one of the highest bidders with equal probability.
Let ρi(S, b) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that bidder i gets the subset S ⊆ {A,B}













A strategy for bidder i is a measurable function βi : [0, 1]2 → B. Given a profile of




Vi(β(t); ti)f1(t1) . . . fN(tN) d t .
An application of Theorem 4.1 yields that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies. The equilibrium strategies (β1, β2) have the following
property: for every pair of types ti, t′i ∈ Ti, with i = 1, 2, if tAi ≥ t′Ai and tBi ≤ t′Bi ,
then βi(ti)A ≥ βi(t′i)A and βi(ti)B ≤ βi(t′i)B. That is, player i’s equilibrium bid for
object A increases (and her bid for object B decreases) as tAi increases (decreases)
and tBi decreases. In this model, bid shading happens for two reasons. First, it hap-
pens for the usual reason in first-price auctions, due to the trade-off between a lower
chance of winning versus a higher payoff when winning. Second, players shade their
bids for the least valuable object even further, to reduce the probability of winning
(and paying) for both objects, when the second object gives them zero marginal value.
The proofs of all claims made in this section are in Appendix C.
3. Mathematical framework
We now review the basic mathematical frameworks that are combined to yield
the results in this paper: absolute retracts, lattice theory, and abstract simplicial
complexes.
3.1. Absolute retracts. Fix a metric space X. If Y is a metric space, a set Z ⊆ Y is
a retract of Y if there is a continuous function r : Y → Z with r(z) = z for all z ∈ Z.
Such function r is called a retraction. The space X is an absolute retract6 (AR) or
an absolute neighborhood retract (ANR) if, whenever X is homeomorphic to a closed
subset Z of a metric space Y , Z is a retract of Y or a retract of a neighborhood of
itself, respectively. Since the “is a retract of” relation is transitive, a consequence is
6The terms “metric absolute retract” and “absolute retract for metric spaces” are used in mathe-
matical literature that also considers spaces that satisfy the embedding condition for other types of
topological spaces.
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that a retract of an AR (ANR) is an AR (ANR). An ANR is an AR if and only if it
is contractible (Borsuk, 1967, Theorem 9.1). A contractible set is a set that can be
reduced to one of its points by a continuous deformation. Formally, a set X is said
to be contractible if it is homotopic to one of its points x ∈ X, that is, if there is a
continuous map h : [0, 1] × X → X such that h(0, · ) : X → X is the identity map
and h(1, · ) : X → X is the constant map sending each point to x. In this case, the
mapping h is denoted a contraction.
The Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem (Eilenberg and Montgomery, 1946)
asserts that if X is a nonempty compact AR, F : X ↠ X is a closed-graph correspon-
dence, and the values of F are “acyclic,” then F has a fixed point. For the purposes
of this paper, it suffices to know that a contractible set is acyclic, so that F has
a fixed point if its values are contractible. Kinoshita (1953) gives an example of a
compact contractible subset of R3 and a continuous function from this space to itself
that does not have a fixed point, so the assumption that X is a compact AR cannot
be weakened to “compact and contractible.”
In Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) a large part of the analytic effort is de-
voted to showing that the set of monotone best responses to a profile of monotone
strategies is convex valued. However, Reny (2011) provides a simple construction
that shows that this set is contractible valued. In addition, passing to the more gen-
eral Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem allows many of the assumptions of
earlier results to be relaxed. The weakening of hypotheses does not complicate the
proof of contractibility, but instead there is the challenge of showing that the set of
(equivalence classes of) monotone pure strategy profiles is an AR. Since the set of
monotone strategy profiles is contractible, Reny could demonstrate this by verifying
the sufficient conditions for a space to be an ANR given by Theorem 3.4 of Dugundji
(1965), which is derived from necessary and sufficient conditions given earlier in that
paper that in turn build on Dugundji (1952) and Dugundji (1957).
A central theme of this paper is that there is a variety of conditions that imply that
a space is an AR. Any of these is potentially the basis of an equilibrium existence
result for some type of Bayesian game, and we will provide novel existence results of
this sort. In particular, it will be possible to verify other sufficient conditions for a
space to be an AR that are related to the order structure of the space of monotonic
strategy profiles, and are thus in a sense more natural. Perhaps more importantly,
they are flexible, allowing for existence under different hypotheses.
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3.2. Simplicial complexes. An abstract simplicial complex is a pair ∆ = (X,X )
in which X is a set of vertices and X is a collection of finite subsets of X that
contains every subset of each of its elements. Elements of X are called simplexes.
The realization of ∆ is
|∆| =
{
π ∈ RX+ :
∑
x∈X
πx = 1, and suppπ ∈ X
}
,
where supp π = {x ∈ X : πx > 0}. For a simplex Y ∈ X , let |Y | = { π ∈
|∆| : supp π ∈ Y }. Then |∆| =
∪
Y ∈X |Y |. We will always assume that {x} ∈ X
for every x ∈ X. We endow |∆| with the CW topology, which is the topology in
which each |Y | has its usual topology and a set is open whenever its intersection with
each |Y | is open.
Let Z be a topological space. A correspondence F : X \ {∅} → Z is a contractible
carrier that sends simplexes of ∆ to subsets of Z if, for every nonempty Y ∈ X :
(a) F (Y ) is contractible, and
(b) if ∅ 6= Y ′ ⊆ Y , then F (Y ′) ⊆ F (Y ).
Moreover, a continuous function f : |∆| → Z is carried by F if f(|Y |) ⊆ F (Y ) for
every Y ∈ X . The following result is from Walker (1981).
Lemma 3.1 (Walker’s carrier lemma). If F is a contractible carrier from ∆ to Z,
then there is a continuous function f : |∆| → Z carried by F , and any two such
functions are homotopic.
For the remainder of the paper, we reserve the notation ∆ for the abstract simplicial
complex in which X is the collection of all finite subsets of X.
3.3. Posets and semilattices. A partially ordered set (poset) is a set X endowed
with a binary relation ≤ that is reflexive (x ≤ x for every x), transitive, and anti-
symmetric (x ≤ y and y ≤ x implies x = y). Let
G≤ = { (x, y) ∈ X ×X : x ≤ y } .
If X is endowed with a σ-algebra Σ, the partial order ≤ is said to be measurable if G≤
is an element of the product σ-algebra Σ⊗ Σ. If X is endowed with a topology, the
partial order ≤ is said to be closed if G≤ is closed in the product topology of X ×X.
If X is a subset of a real vector space, the partial order ≤ is said to be convex if G≤
is convex. Since { (x, x) : x ∈ X } ⊆ G≤, if ≤ is convex, then X is necessarily convex.
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A partially ordered set X is a semilattice7 if any two elements x, y ∈ X have
a least upper bound x ∨ y. If this is the case, then the semilattice operation is
obviously associative, commutative, and idempotent. That is, x ∨ x = x for all
x ∈ X. Conversely, if ∨ is a binary operation on X that is associative, commutative,
and idempotent, then there is a partial order on X given by x ≤ y if and only if
x∨ y = y that makes X a semilattice for which ∨ is the least upper bound operator.8
If the greatest lower bound of any two elements x, y ∈ X exists, then it is denoted by
x ∧ y.
A subset Y ⊆ X is a subsemilattice if x ∨ y ∈ Y for all x, y ∈ X. Evidently
the intersection of any collection of subsemilattices is a subsemilattice. A metric
semilattice is a semilattice endowed with a metric such that (x, y) 7→ x ∨ y is a
continuous function from X ×X to X. A metric semilattice is locally complete if, for
every x ∈ X and every neighborhood U of x, there is a neighborhood W such that
every nonempty W ′ ⊆ W has a least upper bound that is contained in U .
3.4. The hyperspace of a compact metric semilattice. If X is a compact metric
space, the hyperspace of X is the set S(X) of nonempty closed subsets of X endowed
with the topology that has as a subbasis the set of sets of the form
N(U, V ) = {C ∈ S(X) : C ⊆ U and C ∩ V 6= ∅ }
where U, V ⊆ X are open. The space X is locally connected if it has a base of
connected open sets. Wojdysławski (1939) showed that if X is connected and locally
connected, then S(X) is an AR. (Kelley (1942) reproves this result, and places it in
a broader context.)
Now suppose X is a compact metric semilattice. It is easy to show that any subset
S ⊆ X has a least upper bound that we denote by ∨S. We say that X has small
subsemilattices if it has a neighborhood base of subsemilattices, which is called an
idempotent basis. It is easy to show that X is locally complete if and only if it has
small subsemilattices. Identifying each x ∈ X with {x} ∈ S(X), we may regard X
as a subset of S(X). McWaters (1969) showed that if X has small subsemilattices,
then the map C 7→ ∨C is continuous and consequently a retraction. As McWaters
points out, in conjunction with Wojdysławski’s result, this result implies the following
theorem.
7This concept is often described as a join semilattice in contexts in which one also considers meet
semilattices, which are posets in which any pair of elements has greatest lower bound.
8Verification of the details underlying this assertion is straightforward.
BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES 10
Theorem 3.2. If X is connected, locally connected, and locally complete, then it is
an AR.
In the Bayesian game considered in Reny (2011), type and action spaces are as-
sumed to be semilattices, and strategy spaces are thus ordered by the induced point-
wise ordering. As a result, the subset of monotone strategies is a sub-semilattice,
therefore contractible to its least upper bound. In the following section, we extend
this result to more general partially ordered subsets of strategies, including subsets
that are not necessarily given the induced pointwise ordering or that may not have a
least upper bound.
3.5. A new class of retracts. We can now describe a new class of absolute re-
tracts, generated by combining the order structure of posets and abstract simplicial
complexes. Let X be a metric space and a poset. (We do not assume that the order
is closed.) A (finite) chain in X is a (finite) completely ordered subset of X. When
X is a partially ordered space, we consider the order complex Γ = (X,X Γ) of X.
The order complex Γ is the abstract simplicial complex for which the set of vertices
is X itself and the collection of simplexes X Γ is the collection of finite chains of X.
If Γ = (X,X Γ) is the order complex of X and ∆ = (X,X ) is the abstract simplicial
complex in which the simplexes are all finite subsets of X, then X Γ ⊆ X , and we
regard the geometric realization |Γ| as a subspace of |∆|. If Y is a finite subset of X,
then Y ∈ X and we denote by |Y Γ| the realization of Y on the order complex Γ, that
is, |Y Γ| = |Y | ∩ |Γ|.
The following definition describes a novel mathematical concept.9 We say that a
sequence of subsets of X converges to x ∈ X if the sequence is eventually contained
in each neighborhood of x.
Definition 3.3. A hulling of X is a collection H of subsets of X such that:
(a) H is closed under intersection;
(b) every finite subset of X is contained in some element of H;
(c) for each nonempty Y ∈ H, the realization |Y Γ| is contractible.
When Y is a finite subset of X, the H-hull of Y , denoted by H(Y ), is the intersection
of all Y ′ ∈ H containing Y . The hulling H is small if, for any sequence of finite sets
Yn converging to a point x, the sequence H(Yn) also converges to x.
9It is a generalization of the notion of a zellij in McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011).
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Note that if X has an upper bound, then |Γ| is contractible. Therefore, if X is
a semilattice and H is the collection of all finite sub-semilattices of X, then H is a
hulling. Figure 1 shows examples of other kinds of sets that can compose a hulling.
Figure 2 is an example of a set Y for which |H(Y )Γ| is not contractible, and thus














(a) Standard sub-semilattice hull





































(d) A non-sub-semilattice hull











Figure 2. Example of a set that cannot compose a hulling
Definition 3.4. A monotone realization is a continuous function h : |Γ| → X. A
monotone realization h is said to be local whenever, for every sequence Yn of nonempty
finite chains converging to x ∈ X, the sequence h(|Yn|) also converges to x.
Together, the notions of hulling and monotone realization describe what we call
order-convexity.
BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES 12
Definition 3.5. A partially ordered set (X,≤) is order-convex if there is a small
hulling H and a local monotone realization h for X such that
(a) for every finite subset Y ⊆ X, we have H(Y ) ⊆ X; and
(b) for every finite chain Y in X, we have h(|H(Y )Γ|) ⊆ X.
Remark 3.6. Section B in the Appendix proposes easy-to-check conditions for a hulling
to be small and a monotone realization to be local.
The following lemma establishes that every order-convex, separable, metric space
is an absolute retract. Lemma 3.7 is the main tool used to prove the results.
Lemma 3.7. If (X,≤) is partially ordered space that is separable, metric, closed, and
order-convex, then X is an absolute retract.
The proof of Lemma 3.7 can be found in the Appendix A.
4. Class of Bayesian games
We consider the class of Bayesian games described by the following tuple
G = ((T, T ), π, A, u) .
The space (T, T ) = ⊗i(Ti, Ti) is a product of N measurable spaces of types. The
probability measure π ∈ ∆(T ) is the common prior ; we let πi be the marginal of π
on Ti. The space (A,A) = ⊗i(Ai,Ai) is a product of N measurable spaces of actions;
we assume that each Ai is a compact subset of some Banach space Li and is endowed
with a σ-algebra Ai that includes the Borel sets. Finally, the tuple u = (u1, . . . , uN)
is a profile of bounded jointly measurable payoff functions ui : T × A → R.10
A (pure) strategy for player i is a function from Ti to Ai that is πi-a.e. equal to
a measurable function. Let Si be the set of player i’s strategies, and let S =
∏
i Si
be the set of strategy profiles. We regard the space of strategies Si as a subspace of
L1(Ti, πi), the space of Bochner-integrable functions (equivalence classes) from Ti to






10We use standard notation for the indexing of player profiles: for a N -tuple (Xi)Ni=1 of sets we let
X =
∏
i Xi, and for each player i we let X−i =
∏
j ̸=i Xj . Vectors in X are called profiles. A profile
x ∈ X is also written as (xi, x−i) where xi is the i-th coordinate of x and x−i is the projection of
x into X−i. We also use standard notation for probability: if (X,Σ) is a measurable space, then
∆(X) is the set of probability measures on X.
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A strategy si ∈ Si is a best response to s−i ∈ S−i if Ui(si, s−i) ≥ Ui(s′i, s−i) for all
s′i ∈ Si. A strategy profile s ∈ S is an equilibrium if, for each i, si is a best response
to s−i.
Let Bi : S−i → Si denote the best response correspondence of player i:
Bi(s−i) = {si ∈ Si : si ∈ argmax
si∈Si
Ui(si, s−i)} .
Let B : S → S be the cartesian product of the Bi: B(s) = B1(s−1)× · · · ×BN(s−N).
We make the following assumption on the common prior.
Assumption A.1. For every player i, the common prior π is absolutely continuous
with respect to the product of its marginals.11
We also make the following assumption on the players’ payoffs.
Assumption A.2. For every player i, the function ui : T ×A → R is continuous in
a and measurable in t.
Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, the best response correspondence B is non-empty
and has closed graph by an application of the Vector Dominated Convergence Theo-
rem and Berge Maximum Theorem.12 We are ready to state our main result.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions A.1–A.2 are satisfied. If, for every player i,
there is a compact, order-convex subset of strategies Ki ⊆ Si such that Bi(s−i)∩Ki is a
nonempty, order-convex set for every s−i ∈ K−i, then the game G has an equilibrium
in K.
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, every compact, order-convex subset of strategies is an absolute
retract. Consider the subcorrespondence of best responses B : K ↠ K, given by
B(s) = B(s) ∩K .
As defined, B has closed-graph, and compact, order-convex values. Therefore, it
satisfies the hypotheses of Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem. Hence it has
a fixed point in K, which is a Bayesian equilibrium of the game G. □
11If the marginals are purely atomic, then this assumption is trivially true. If the marginals are
nonatomic, then an application of the Radon-Nikodym theorem yields that each player i’s ex ante
payoff Ui can be written as the integral of their interim payoff Vi. Therefore, if si, s′i ∈ Bi(s−i) are
two best responses, then the piecewise combination si1E+s′i1Ti\E ∈ Si is also an element of Bi(s−i)
for every measurable set E ⊆ Ti. Further, a fixed point of the best response correspondence B is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the traditional (interim) sense.
12We refer the reader to Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorems 11.46, 13.6, 17.11, 17.28, and 17.31).
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Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 not only helps proving existence of equilibrium results, but
it also provides additional, useful information regarding how the equilibrium found
looks like. In fact, this is the main motivation for the analysis in Athey (2001),
McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011).
Notice that this result does not require the players’ type and action spaces to
be partially ordered. Nor it requires the partial order on Ki to be induced by the
pointwise order. In fact, it allows for partial orders that may depend on the whole
strategy, as a function from types to actions. Further, Theorem 4.1 does not require
the marginals of the probability measure π to be atomless. It is, however, easier to
get order-convex best responses when the priors are atomless, as all three auctions
analyzed in Section 5 show.
5. Additional applications to auctions
We present two additional applications of the main result to auctions. Most of
the auction literature relies on existence of monotone equilibrium.13 Although it is
not difficult to write auctions in which monotonicity fails, as the examples in Jack-
son (2009), Reny and Zamir (2004), and McAdams (2007) show, it remains unclear
whether or not non-monotonicities in the best-response correspondence pose a serious
threat to the existence of equilibrium. The auctions in this section shed some light
on this issue.
The following auctions illustrate different directions in which Theorem 4.1 extends
the benchmark results of Athey (2001), McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011). The
first one concerns an all-pay auction that encompasses and generalizes some standard
existence results for such settings, including Athey (2001). The main advance here
is in allowing for interdependent valuations and information structures that may
fail the weak single-crossing property, yielding equilibria that are not necessarily
monotone in players’ types. This all-pay auction shows that, even when restricted to
the class of games with unidimensional type and action spaces, Theorem 4.1 extends
the analysis of pure-strategy equilibria to a broader range of models. The second
application involves a first-price auction in which bidders’ types are multidimensional
and bidders’ valuations can be arbitrarily interdependent. The purpose of the second
application is to highlight that, within the class of auctions with multidimensional
types, Theorem 4.1 allows for an analysis of a much richer class of bidders’ preferences,
in comparison to the existence results in McAdams (2003) and Reny (2011). In both
13We refer to Kaplan and Zamir (2015) and Klemperer (1999) for excellent surveys.
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applications, there is no order on the bidder’s types that allows for standard arguments
to be used to show existence of monotone equilibrium. The proofs of all claims made
in this section are in Appendix C.
Before describing the auctions, we make a closing remark with regards to modelling
choices. In all of the applications in this paper, bidders submit bids at predetermined
discrete levels, that is, there exists a minimal increment by which the bid may be
raised. Although the auction literature deals almost entirely with continuous bids,
in practice bidders are not able to choose their bid from a continuum. At best,
the smallest currency unit imposes such restriction on feasible bids; at worst, the
auctioneer may restrict the set of acceptable bids even further. We thus consider this
a natural assumption, which yields a model that is both parsimonious and realistic.
However, it is possible to extend the analysis in this section to permit a continuum
bids under additional assumptions.
5.1. All-pay auction. Consider an all-pay auction with incomplete information. Af-
ter observing the realization of their signals, bidders submit their bids, and pay their
bids regardless of whether or not they win the object. This kind of model has been
used to investigate rent-seeking and lobbying activities, competitions for a monop-
oly position, competitions for multiple prizes, political contests, promotions in labor
markets, trade wars, and R&D races with irreversible investments.
There is a single object for sale and I bidders. Each bidder i observes the realization
of a private signal ti ∈ [τ , τ ] = Ti. Signals of all bidders T = (T1, . . . , TI) are
drawn from some joint distribution with density f : [τ , τ ]I → R+. The value of the
object being auctioned to bidder i is given by the measurable mapping vi : [τ , τ ]I →
R. We make the following assumption on the primitives of the model, which is a
generalization of the weak monotonicity condition of Siegel (2014).
Assumption B.1. For each bidder i, there is a finite partition of the set of signals
Ti = ∪nIni into subintervals Ini such that for every t−i the restriction of the weighted
valuation vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) to each subinterval Ini is monotone14 in ti.
Remark 5.1. Essentially, Assumption B.1 puts an upper bound on the number of times
bidder i’s weighted valuation changes direction, it allows for very general interdepen-
dence and correlation structures. In particular, it allows for the weighted valuations
to be nondecreasing on some subintervals and nonincreasing on others, and does not
impose any restrictions across the subintervals {Ini }n. The independent private value
14By monotone, we mean either nonincreasing or nondecreasing.
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auction corresponds to the special case in which vi(ti, t−i) = ti and f(t−i | ti) does
not depend on ti.
Most of the literature on all-pay auctions concentrates on the case in which the
players’ weighted valuation functions are nondecreasing, yielding monotone equilibria.
Assumption B.1 is a natural generalization of that single-crossing condition.
Given signal ti, bidder i places a bid b, chosen from a finite set of bids B ⊆ R.
The allocation of prizes is determined by the profile of bids. In particular, we assume
that there is a function α : {1, . . . , I} × BI → [0, 1], such that α(b) is a probability
measure over bidders. The interpretation is that αi(b) is the probability that bidder i
gets the object, given profile of bids b. We only assume that the allocation mapping
bi 7→ αi(b) is nondecreasing, that is, a higher bid will increase the probability that
bidder i gets the object.
A strategy for bidder i is a measurable function βi : Ti → B. Given a profile of
strategies of other bidders β−i, bidder i’s interim payoff is given by
Vi(b | ti, β−i) =
∫
[τ ,τ ]I−1
αi(b, β−i(t−i))vi(t)f(t−i | ti) dt−i − b .





Vi(βi(ti) | ti, β−i)f(ti) dti .
Theorem 4.1 implies that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which
each bidder i uses a strategy that is monotone in ti when restricted to each subinter-
val In.
5.2. First-price auction with interdependent values. Consider a sealed-bid
first-price auction in which bidders’ types are multidimensional and possibly inter-
dependent. This kind of model has been used to study, for example, procurement
auctions, in which bidders are suppliers who try to underbid each other to sell an
object or provide a service to a potential buyer. Government contracts are usually
awarded by procurement auctions, and firms often use this auction format when buy-
ing inputs or subcontracting work.
There is a single object for sale and N bidders. Each bidder i’s type is a vector ti =
(ti1, . . . , tiK) ∈ [τ , τ ]K . Bidders’ types are independently drawn. Let fi : [τ , τ ]K → R+
denote the density distribution of bidder i’s types. The value of the object being
auctioned to bidder i is given by the measurable map vi : [τ , τ ]KN → R+.
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We assume that the map vi is the sum of polynomial functions in each bidders’








j1 · · · t
dmK
jK ,
where Mj is a finite index set for each j = 1, . . . , N and, for each m ∈ Mj, the number
αm is the coefficient of the m-th term and dmk are nonnegative integers.
The interpretation is that each dimension k of bidder i’s type represents an inherent
characteristic of the object, and bidders observe a noisy and independent informative
signal regarding these characteristics. Each of these characteristics may or may not
be intrinsically desirable. Thus, while we do not rule out symmetric bidders, we do
allow for heterogeneous preferences in the sense that different bidders feel differently
about each characteristic. In particular, for each dimension k, it may be the case
that some bidders prefer higher levels of k, whereas other bidders may prefer lower
or even intermediate levels.
Bidder i observes the realization of her private type ti, that gives information about
the characteristics of the object. Upon observing ti, bidder i submits a bid bi from
a finite set of bids B ⊆ R. Given a vector b = (b1, . . . , bN) of bids of all bidders,
the object is awarded to the highest bidder, who pays her bid. If there is a tie at
the highest bid, then the object is awarded to one of the highest bidders with equal
probability. Let ρi(b) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that bidder i gets the object
given profile of bids b. Given a vector b of bids, bidder i’s payoff is given by
ui(b; t) = ρi(b)[vi(t)− bi] .
In this context, a strategy for bidder i is a measurable function βi : [τ , τ ]K → B.




ui(β(t); t)f1(t1) . . . fN(tN) d t .
Theorem 4.1 implies that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which
each bidder i uses a strategy that is (locally) nondecreasing in tik whenever ∂vi∂tik (t) ≥ 0,
and (locally) nonincreasing whenever ∂vi
∂tik
(t) ≤ 0.
6. Sufficient conditions on primitives
For readers interested in applications, it may be easier to verify sufficient, but less
general, conditions that lead to the existence of Bayesian equilibria. Here we provide
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two sets of such conditions. The first set, formally stated in Theorem 6.1, is written
in terms of payoff differences. The second set of conditions, stated in Corollary 6.3,
imposes restrictions on differentiable payoffs.
Throughout this section, we make the following assumptions:
(1) Each player i’s type space Ti = [τ i, τ i]Mi × [τ i, τ i]M
′
i is a nondegenerate Eu-
clidean cube, with the coordinate-wise partial order.
(2) Each player i’s types are distributed according to the probability density fi
over Ti, not necessarily everywhere positive, but independently of other play-
ers’ types.
(3) Each player i’s set of actions Ai = [αi, αi]Ni × [αi, αi]N
′
i is an Euclidean cube,
endowed with the coordinate-wise partial order.
(4) Each player i’s payoff function ui : A × T → R is bounded, measurable in t,
and continuous in a.
The following theorem establishes that it suffices to check whether the first differ-
ences of payoffs are increasing in specific directions of the players’ action and type
spaces.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose that the payoff function ui : A × T → R of every player i
satisfies the following two conditions:
(a) Take any given a−i ∈ A−i and t ∈ T . If a, a′ ∈ Ai, then
ui(a, a−i; t)− ui((aNi ∧ a′Ni , aN ′i ∨ a
′
N ′i
), a−i; t) ≥ 0
⇒ ui((aNi ∨ a′Ni , aN ′i ∧ a
′
N ′i
), a−i; t)− ui(a′, a−i; t) ≥ 0 .
(b) Take any given a−i ∈ A−i and t−i ∈ T−i. Suppose ai, a′i ∈ Ai are such that
aik ≥ a′ik for k ∈ Ni and aik ≤ a′ik for k ∈ N ′i ; and ti, t′i ∈ Ti are such that
tiℓ ≥ t′iℓ for ℓ ∈ Mi and tiℓ ≤ t′iℓ for ℓ ∈ M ′i , then
ui(ai, a−i; t
′
i, t−i)− ui(a′i, a−i; t′i, t−i) ≥ 0
⇒ ui(ai, a−i; ti, t−i)− ui(a′i, a−i; ti, t−i) ≥ 0 .
Then there exists a Bayesian equilibrium in which each player i plays a pure strategy
si such that the projection ti 7→ sik(ti), with k ∈ Ni (k ∈ N ′i), is nondecreasing
(nonincreasing) in tiℓ for ℓ ∈ Mi and nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in tiℓ for ℓ ∈ M ′i .
Remark 6.2. In Theorem 6.1, if N ′i = ∅ and M ′i = ∅, then condition (a) reduces to
the usual quasi-supermodularity of McAdams (2003) and condition (b) reduces to the
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single-crossing property of McAdams (2003). Then the theorem implies existence of
a monotone Bayesian equilibrium.
We can now state a corollary of Theorem 6.1 for the case when the players’ payoffs
are twice continuously differentiable.
Corollary 6.3. Suppose that for each player i, the payoff function ui : A× T → R is
twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the following two conditions:
(a) For every a ∈ A and t ∈ T ,
∂2ui(a; t)
∂aik∂aik′
≥ 0 if either k, k′ ∈ Ni or k, k′ ∈ N ′i ; and
∂2ui(a; t)
∂aik∂aik′
≤ 0 if k ∈ Ni and k′ ∈ N ′i .
(b) For every a ∈ A and t ∈ T ,
∂2ui(a; t)
∂aik∂tiℓ
≥ 0 if k ∈ Ni and ℓ ∈ Mi; or k ∈ N ′i and ℓ ∈ M ′i ;
∂2ui(a; t)
∂aik∂tiℓ
≤ 0 if k ∈ N ′i and ℓ ∈ Mi; or k ∈ Ni and ℓ ∈ M ′i .
Then there exists a Bayesian equilibrium in which each player i plays a pure strategy
si such that the projection ti 7→ sik(ti), with k ∈ Ni (k ∈ N ′i), is nondecreasing
(nonincreasing) in tiℓ for ℓ ∈ Mi and nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in tiℓ for ℓ ∈ M ′i .
All proofs for this section can be found in Appendix D.
7. Literature
There is an extensive literature concerned with existence of equilibrium for Bayesian
games, with Milgrom and Weber (1985) being a groundbreaking contribution. Often
one is interested in equilibria in which the agents’ strategies have some prescribed
structure. Within many economic frameworks, it is natural to look in particular for
equilibria in which each agent follows a pure strategy that is an increasing function of
her type. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) were the first to develop a general theory and
method for this kind of analysis. Athey (2001), McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011)
provide increasingly general existence results of this sort. Remarkably, Reny (2011)
introduces far-reaching new techniques applying the fixed point theorem of Eilenberg
and Montgomery (1946, Theorem 5). This is done by showing that with atomless type
spaces the set of monotone functions is an absolute retract and when the values of the
best response correspondence are non-empty sub-semilattices of monotone functions,
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they too are absolute retracts. This paper extends this line of research, providing a
theory that encompasses Reny’s results while generalizing the relevant methods.15 In
this section, we show how the main result in Reny (2011), which generalizes Athey
(2001) and McAdams (2003), can be derived from Theorem 4.1. As a reminder, we
state Reny’s main result in a concise form.
Theorem 7.1 (Theorem 4.1 of Reny (2011)). Suppose that the following assumptions
hold.
(1) For each player i,
(a) πi is atomless;
(b) Ti is endowed with a measurable partial order for which there is a count-
able set T 0i ⊆ Ti such that for every E ∈ Ti with πi(E) > 0 there are
ti, t
′
i ∈ E with [ti, t′i] ∩ T 0i 6= ∅;
(c) Ai is compact metric space, and a semilattice with closed partial order;
(d) either:
(i) Ai is a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space and
the partial order on Ai is convex, or
(ii) Ai is a locally complete metric semilattice;
(e) ui(t, · ) is continuous for every t ∈ T .
(2) Each player’s set of nondecreasing pure best responses is nonempty and closed
with respect to the supremum operation whenever the other players use non-
decreasing pure strategies.
Then the Bayesian game has an equilibrium in nondecreasing pure strategies.
First, we show that, under the assumptions listed, the set of nondecreasing strate-
gies is order-convex. Fix a player i. Being a compact, metric space, the set of actions
Ai can be isometrically embedded in a Banach space Li. The set of nondecreas-
ing strategies Mi for player i is thus a subset of Bochner-integrable functions from
Ti to Li, under the L1-norm topology. Partially order Mi according to the (almost
everywhere) pointwise order, as follows
fi ≥ gi ⇐⇒ fi(ti) ≥ gi(ti) πi − a.e .
Under this partial order, the set of nondecreasing strategies Mi is a metric semilattice.
Further, by Reny (2011, Lemmas A.10 and A.11), the set Mi is L1-norm compact.
The next lemma establishes that Mi is also locally complete.
15A recent development, specifically emphasizing existence of equilibrium in auctions, is Prokopovych
and Yannelis (2019).
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Lemma 7.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 7.1–(1), the set of nondecreasing
strategies Mi for every player i is locally complete.
Proof. Case (1.d.i): We show that, under assumption (1.c), if Ai is a convex subset
of a locally convex topological vector space with a convex partial order, then Ai is a
locally complete metric semilattice. Thus case (1.d.i) reduces to (1.d.ii). Given Reny
(2011, Lemma A.18), it suffices to show that if an is a sequence of actions converging
to a, then bm = ∨n≥man also converges to a as m goes to infinity. Suppose bm does
not converge to a. Because Ai is compact, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may
assume that bm converges to b 6= a. Since am ≤ bm for every m and ≤ is a closed
order, it follows that a ≤ b. And since a 6= b, it follows that a < b. Because Ai is
a convex subset of a metric, locally convex topological vector space, with a closed
order, there exist two disjoint, convex neighborhoods U of a and V of b such that
a′ < b′ for every a ∈ U and b ∈ V . Pick α ∈ (0, 1) such that αa + (1 − α)b ∈ V .
Since ≤ is closed, it follows that αa+ (1− α)b < b, and notice that there is a convex
neighborhood W of b such that αa + (1 − α)b < b′ for every b′ ∈ W . Let M be an
integer such that an ∈ U for every n ≥ M and bm ∈ W for every m ≥ M . Therefore,
αa+(1−α)b is an upper bound on the set
∪
n≥M{an}. However, αa+(1−α)b < bM ,
which contradicts bM = ∨n≥Man.
Case (1.d.ii): Given Reny (2011, Lemma A.18), it suffices to show that if fn is
a sequence of nondecreasing strategies converging in the L1-norm to f , then ∨n≥mfn
also converges to f as m goes to infinity. So let fn be such sequence. From Reny
(2011, Lemma A.12), it follows that fn converges πi-almost everywhere to f . Given
that Ai is locally complete and using Reny (2011, Lemma A.18) again, it follows
that ∨n≥mfn(ti) converges to f(ti) for πi-almost every ti as m goes to infinity, which
implies L1-norm convergence. □
Given Lemmas B.1, B.2, and B.3, if the set of nondecreasing strategies Mi has
monotonically contractible order intervals, then it is order-convex.
Lemma 7.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 7.1–(1), the set of nondecreasing
strategies Mi for every player i is order-convex.
Proof. From Reny (2011, Lemmas A.3 and A.15), it follows that if [fi, f ′i ] is an order
interval in Mi, then h : [0, 1]× [fi, f ′i ] → [fi, f ′i ] given by
h(α, gi) =
gi(ti) if Φi(ti) ≤ α ;f ′i(ti) otherwise .
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is a monotone contraction. Thus, Mi is order-convex. □
Notice that each player i’s best reply is closed with respect to the supremum, by
assumption, and closed with respect to the monotone contraction, by construction.
Thus, given Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3, the existence of an equilibrium in nondecreasing
pure strategies follows from Theorem 4.1.
Appendix A. Proofs for Section 3
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3.7.
Proof. If X is separable, metric space, then it can be isometrically embedded as a
subset of a Banach space Y . It suffices to construct a retraction r : X → Y .
For each y ∈ Y \X, let φ(y) = inf{‖y − x‖Y : x ∈ X}. Define the correspondence
F : Y \X ↠ X by
F (y) = {x ∈ X : ‖y − x‖Y < 2φ(y)} .
Because φ(y) > 0 for every y ∈ Y \X, it follows that F (y) is nonempty. Moreover,
F has open lower sections. Thus, if X∗ is a countable dense subset of X, then
{F−1(x) : x ∈ X∗} is a countable open cover of Y \ X. Let U be a locally finite
refinement, and let {πU : U ∈ U} be a partition of unity subordinated to it. For each
U ∈ U , there is at least one x ∈ X∗ such that U ⊆ F−1(x); let xU denote such x.
For every y ∈ Y \ X, we identify the collection π(y) = {πU(y) : U 3 y} with the
corresponding point in the simplex |{xU : U 3 y}|. By Walker’s carrier lemma, there
exists a continuous function f : |∆| → |Γ|, such that for every finite subset Y ′ ⊆ Y ,
f(|Y ′|) ⊆ |H(Y ′)Γ|. Define the function r : Y \X → X by
r(y) = h(f(π(y)) .
Extend the function r to X by setting r(x) = x for every x ∈ X.
Since r|Y \X and r|X are continuous by construction, it suffices to check that, for
every sequence (yn) ⊆ Y \X converging to some x ∈ X, the sequence (r(yn)) converges
to r(x) = x. But, for every n, if x′ ∈ supp π(yn), then d(yn, x′) < 2φ(yn). As n goes
to infinity, φ(yn) converges to zero. Because the hulling is small, that implies that
H(suppπ(yn)) converges to x. Further, because the monotone realization is local,
h(f(π(yn))) converges to x. □
Appendix B. Locally complete semilattices
We now investigate the relationship between these structures and locally complete
metric semilattices.
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Lemma B.1. If X is a locally complete, metric semilattice and H is the family of
all finite subsemilattices, then H is a small hulling.
Proof. Let Yn be a sequence of finite sets converging to x ∈ X, and let U be a
neighborhood of x. Since X is locally complete, there is a neighborhood W of x such
that every nonempty Y ⊆ W has a least upper bound in U . Suppose that Yn ⊆ W ,
as is the case for large n. Then { y1 ∨ · · · ∨ yk : y1, . . . , yk ∈ Yn } is a subsemilattice
that is contained in any subsemilattice that contains Yn, so it is H(Yn), and each of
its elements is contained in U . Thus H(Yn) ⊆ U for large n. □
The notion of a order-convexity is a straightforward generalization of the path-
connected metric-lattices extensively studied in Anderson (1959), McWaters (1969),
Lawson (1969), Lawson and Williams (1970), and Gierz et al. (1980). It arises quite
naturally. An order interval in X is a set defined by
[x, x′] = { y ∈ X : x ≤ y ≤ x′ } ,
for some x ≤ x′. We say that the order interval [x, x′] is monotonically contractible
if there is a contraction ℓ : [0, 1]× [x, x′] → [x, x′] such that if α ≤ α′, then ℓ(α, y) ≤
ℓ(α′, y) for every y ∈ [x, x′]. The next lemma shows that every metric semilattice
with monotonically contractible order intervals has a monotone realization.
Lemma B.2. If X is metric semilattice with monotonically contractible order inter-
vals, then there exists a continuous function h : |Γ| → X such that h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ]
for every finite chain Y ⊆ X.
Proof. Notice that for any finite set Y the hull H(Y ) is the set {∨Z : Z ⊆ S, Z 6= ∅}.
We will use the following fact: any continuous function from the boundary of a cell
to a contractible space can be continuously extended across the entire cell. We will
construct the monotone realization h by induction on the skeletons of Γ. Recall that
the n-skeleton Γ(n) is the subcomplex consisting of the simplexes of Γ of dimension
n or less. For every vertex x in Γ(0), let h(x) = x. For each simplex Y in Γ(1),
choose a monotone path ℓ : [0, 1] → [∧Y,∨Y ], and let h(π) = ℓ(π(∧Y )) for every
π ∈ |Y |. Notice that h(δ∧Y ) = ∧Y and h(δ∨Y ) = ∨Y . Therefore, h is well-defined
and continuous on |Γ(1)|. Further, h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ] for every 1-simplex Y in Γ(1).
The inductive hypothesis is that h : |Γ(n)| → X is continuous and h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ]
for every n-simplex Y in Γ(n). Now, suppose Z is an (n+1)-simplex. For every proper
face Y of Z, h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ] ⊆ [∧Z,∨Z]. Therefore, h(|BdZ|) ⊆ [∧Z,∨Z]. Since
Z is a cell and [∧Z,∨Z] is contractible, h can be continuously extended over |Z| in
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such a way that h(|Z|) ⊆ [∧Z,∨Z]. Since the map h : |Γ| → X is continuous if and
only if it is continuous on each simplex, it follows that h is a monotone realization. □
If additionally X is locally complete, then the monotone realization constructed in
the proof of Lemma B.2 is local.
Lemma B.3. Suppose X is a locally complete, metric semilattice with a monotone
realization h : |Γ| → X. If h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ] for every finite chain Y ⊆ X, then h is
local.
Proof. Let Yn ⊆ X be a sequence of nonempty finite chains converging to x ∈ X, and
let Y n = ∧Yn and Y n = ∨Yn. For every n take any xn ∈ [Y n, Y n]. Birkhoff’s identity
implies that for every n
bY n − Y nc = bY n ∨ xn − Y n ∨ xnc+ bY n ∧ xn − Y n ∧ xnc
= bY n − xnc+ bxn − Y nc ,
where bzc = z∨(−z) denotes the absolute value of z. Since Y n and Y n both converge
to x and X is locally complete, it follows that bY n − Y nc converges to 0. Therefore,
bY n − xnc and bxn − Y nc also converge to 0. Because Y n converges to x, it follows
that xn converges to x too. □
Appendix C. Proofs for Sections 2 and 5
In all three auctions described in this section, the bidders’ type and action spaces
are subsets of Euclidean spaces. When required, we equip these spaces with the
Lebesgue σ-algebra and the Lebesgue measure λ. In particular, this means that
density functions on types are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. Moreover, under these assumptions, the partial order on strategies induced
either by the pointwise supremum or the pointwise infimum is measurable.
C.1. All-pay auction. We first describe the bidder-specific set of strategies Ki. We
then show that, using the sufficient conditions from Lemmas B.2 and B.1, it satisfies
the requirements of Theorem 4.1.
Fix a bidder i. To describe the set Ki, let N+i denote the set of indexes k such that
the weighted valuation vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nondecreasing on the interval Ini , that
is, define
N+i = {n : vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nondecreasing over Ini } .
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Notice that, given Assumption B.1, N+i consists of a finite collection of indexes.
Likewise, define N−i to be the set of indexes k such that the weighted valuation
vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nonincreasing on the interval Ini , that is,
N−i = {n : vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nonincreasing over Ini } .
We may take N+i and N−i to be disjoint. We define Ki to be the set of measurable
functions from Ti = [τ , τ ] to B that are nondecreasing over Ini when n ∈ N+i and
nonincreasing over Ini when n ∈ N−i . Formally, define
Ki = {f : f |Ini is nondecreasing for every n ∈ N
+
i




As defined, Ki is a closed subset of functions of bounded variation, with a uniform
total variation bound of | ∨ B − ∧B| × (|N+i | + |N−i |). Thus, by Helly’s selection
theorem, it is a L1-norm compact subset of measurable functions. The following
lemmas show that Ki satisfies the conditions required to apply Theorem 4.1.
Lemma C.1. The subset of strategies Ki is a locally complete, metric semilattice.
Proof. The set Ki, endowed with the L1-norm, is clearly a metric semilattice. It only
remains to show that it is locally complete. Given Reny (2011, Lemma A.18), it suf-
fices to show that if gk is a sequence of strategies in Ki converging in the L1-norm to
f , then ∨k≥mgk also converges to g as m goes to infinity. Let gk be such sequence. Fix
n ∈ N+i and consider the function given by gk1Ini , where 1E is the indicator function
of E ⊆ Ti. Because gk is nondecreasing on Ini , from Reny (2011, Lemma A.12), it
follows that gk1Ini converges almost everywhere to g1Ini . Applying the same argu-
ment to −gk1Ini for n ∈ N
−
i yields that gk1Ini converges almost everywhere to g1Ini
for every n ∈ N+i ∪ N−i . Since there is a finite number of subintervals, it follows
that gk =
∑
n gk1Ini converges almost everywhere to g =
∑
n g1Ini . Given the real
numbers are locally complete, applying Reny (2011, Lemma A.18) again, it follows
that ∨k≥mgk(ti) converges to g(ti) for almost every ti as m goes to infinity. Therefore,
∨k≥mgk converges to g in the L1-norm. □
In view of Lemma B.1, we record the following corollary of this result.
Corollary C.2. The family H of all finite subsemilattices of Ki is a small hulling.
The next lemma shows that the order intervals of Ki are monotonically contractible.
Lemma C.3. The subset of strategies Ki has monotonically contractible order inter-
vals.
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g′′i (ti) if ti ∈ Ini with k ∈ N+i and | ∨ Ini − ti| ≤ α| ∨ Ini − ∧Ini | ,
g′′i (ti) if ti ∈ Ini with k ∈ N−i and |ti − ∧Ini | ≤ α| ∨ Ini − ∧Ini | ,
gi(ti) otherwise .
The function h is the required monotone contraction. □
As a result of Lemmas B.2 and B.3, we have the following corollary of this result.
Corollary C.4. The subset of strategies Ki is order-convex.
The next two lemmas check that the best response correspondence also satisfies
the conditions of the theorem.
Lemma C.5. The intersection of the best response correspondence Bi(β−i) with Ki
is nonempty for every strategy profile of other bidders β−i.
Proof. Fix a profile of strategies for other players β−i. We show that the interim best
response correspondence
Bi(β−i | ti) = argmax
b∈B
Vi(b | ti, β−i)
has a selection in Ki. Consider the selection gi(ti) = ∨Bi(β−i | ti). It is well-defined
because B is finite. Moreover, it is measurable because the pointwise partial order
is measurable. The proof now procedes by contradiction to show that gi is in Ki.
Suppose gi /∈ Ki. Then there exist t′i > ti, both in some subinterval Ini , such that
either (i) gi(ti) > gi(t′i) and n ∈ N+i , or (ii) gi(t′i) > gi(ti) and n ∈ N−i .
Consider case (i). Because gi is defined as the maximum interim best response, it
follows that gi(ti) /∈ Bi(β−i | t′i). Thus
(2) Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i) > 0 .
Furthermore,




[αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(t′i), β−i(t−i))]vi(t′i, t−i)f(t−i | t′i) dt−i
− gi(ti) + gi(t′i) .
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Since the allocation mapping αi is positive and nondecreasing in its first argument
and vifi is positive and nondecreasing in bidder i’s signal, it follows that∫
[τ ,τ ]I−1
[αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(t′i), β−i(t−i))]vi(t′i, t−i)f(t−i | t′i) dt−i ≥∫
[τ ,τ ]I−1
[αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(t′i), β−i(t−i))]vi(t)f(t−i | ti) dt−i ,
and hence
Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i) ≥ Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | ti, β−i) ,
However, optimality also implies that
Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
and hence
Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
which contradicts equation (2).
Consider now case (ii). Because gi is defined as the maximum interim best response,
it follows that










i), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))]vi(t)f(t−i | ti) dt−i
− gi(t′i) + gi(ti) .
Since the allocation mapping αi is positive and nondecreasing in its first argument












i) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i) ≥ Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i) ,
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However, optimality also implies that
Vi(gi(t
′




i) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
which contradicts equation (3). □
Lemma C.6. The intersection of the best response correspondence Bi(β−i) with Ki
is order-convex for every β−i.
Proof. Fix β−i. Since the intersection of Bi(β−i) with Ki is a closed subset of Ki and
Ki is locally complete, it follows that Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is locally complete. Further, the
best response correspondence Bi is closed with respect to the monotone contraction h
constructed in Lemma C.3. Therefore, Bi(β−i)∩Ki is order-convex for every β−i. □
Corollaries C.2 and C.4, together with Lemmas C.5 and C.6 imply that the as-
sumptions of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied for the all-pay auction when Ki is the set of
strategies of bounded variation defined as by equation (1). Therefore, the all-pay
auction has a Bayesian equilibrium in which bidders play strategies in Ki.
C.2. First-price auction with interdependent values. We first describe the
bidder-specific set of strategies Ki, and show that it is order-convex. We then show
that the best responses satisfy the requirements of Theorem 4.1.
Fix a bidder i. For every subset of indexes L ⊆ {1, . . . , K}, define the following set
of types of bidder i:
TLi =
{
t ∈ [τ , τ ]K : ∂vi
∂tiℓ
(t) ≥ 0 if ℓ ∈ L and ∂vi
∂tiℓ
(t) < 0 if ℓ /∈ L
}
.
Notice that each TLi is a (Borel) measurable subset of [τ , τ ]K . Furthermore, they
constitute a partition of bidder i’s type space, since ∪LTLi = [τ , τ ]K and TLi ∩TL
′
i = ∅
whenever L 6= L′. Thus each ti ∈ [τ , τ ]K is an element of TLi for one and only one
L ⊆ {1, . . . , K}.
Define Ki to be the set of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions from [τ , τ ]K
to B such that their restriction to each TLi is nondecreasing in tiℓ if ℓ ∈ L and
nonincreasing in tiℓ if ℓ /∈ L. We consider Ki to be a subset of the set of real-valued,
measurable functions over [τ , τ ]K under the L1-norm topology. We next show that
the subset Ki is compact.
Lemma C.7. The set Ki is L1-norm compact.
BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES 29
Proof. If ∂vi
∂tiℓ
(t) = 0 for every t ∈ [τ , τ ]K , then the result is straightforward. So we
may assume that is not the case. Let gn ∈ Ki be a sequence of functions in Ki. By the
diagonal argument, there exists a subsequence nk such that limnk gnk(r) = h(r) exists
for every r in a countable dense subset of [τ , τ ]K . Define the function g : [τ , τ ]K → B
by
g(t) = ∧{h(t̃) : t̃ℓ > tℓ if t ∈ TLi and ℓ ∈ L, and t̃ℓ < tℓ if t ∈ TLi and ℓ /∈ L} .
By construction, g ∈ Ki. Moreover, limnk gnk(t) = g(t) for continuity points of g.
Theorem 7 of Brunk et al. (1956) and the fact that the set of roots of a nonzero
polynomial function has zero Lebesgue measure imply that the set of of discontinuity
points of g has zero Lebesgue measure. And since the distribution of bidder i’s types
is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it follows that gnk
converges to g in the L1-norm. □
Partially order Ki by the almost everywhere pointwise order, whereby
gi ≥ g′i ⇐⇒ gi(ti) ≥ g′i(ti) λ-a.e ,
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. With this partial order, the set Ki is a locally
complete semilattice.
Lemma C.8. The set Ki with the almost everywhere pointwise order is a locally
complete lattice.
Proof. Given Reny (2011, Lemma A.18), it suffices to show that if gn is a sequence of
strategies in Ki converging in the L1-norm to f , then ∨n≥mgn also converges to g as
m goes to infinity. Let gn be such sequence. Fix TLi and consider the function given
by gn1TLi , where 1E is the indicator function of E ⊆ Ti. Because gn is nondecreasing
in tiℓ for ℓ ∈ L and nonincreasing in tiℓ for ℓ /∈ L, from Reny (2011, Lemma A.12),
it follows that gn1TLi converges almost everywhere to some g1TLi . Applying the same
argument to each L′ ⊆ {1, . . . .K} yields that gn1TL′i converges almost everywhere to
g1TL′i
for every L′. Since there is a finite number of subsets of {1, . . . , K}, it follows
that gn =
∑
L gn1TLi converges almost everywhere to g =
∑
n g1TLi . Given the real
numbers are locally complete, applying Reny (2011, Lemma A.18) again, it follows
that ∨n≥mgn(ti) converges to g(ti) for almost every ti as m goes to infinity. Therefore,
∨n≥mgn converges to g in the L1-norm. □
Let Hi denote the collection of all finite subsemilattices of Ki. The next lemma
shows that Hi is a small hulling.
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Lemma C.9. The collection Hi of all finite subsemilattices of Ki is a small hulling.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas C.8 and B.1. □
Finally, we define a monotone realization for Ki. For the purposes of this example,
a monotone realization is a continuous function h : |Γ| → Ki from order simplexes in
Γ to Ki.
For every L ⊆ {1, . . . , K} and c ∈ [0, 1], define the following measurable set of
bidder i’s types:
E(c, L) = {t ∈ [τ , τ ]K : tiℓ ≤ (1− c)τ + cτ if ℓ ∈ L, and tiℓ ≥ cτ + (1− c)τ if ℓ /∈ L} .
Notice that the collection {E(c, L) : c ∈ [0, 1]} is an increasing chain of measurable
subsets of bidder i’s type space that reflects the ordering induced by the partial
derivatives of the valuation function in TLi . Further, the Lebesgue measure of each
set E(c, L) is λ(E(c, L)) = c(τ − τ), E(0, L) is a singleton for every L, and E(1, L) =
[τ , τ ]K for every L. Therefore, it follows that, for every ti ∈ [τ , τ ]K , there exists one
L ⊆ {1, . . . , K} such that ti ∈ E(1, L) ∩ TLi = TLi .
If Y ∈ Γ is a simplex in the order complex of Ki, then Y consists of a finite chain in
Ki. Thus the elements in Y can be identified with the ordered vector Y = (g1, . . . , gn),
with g1 ≤ · · · ≤ gn. And a point x in the geometric realization |Y | can be written as
x = (xg1 , xg2 , . . . , xgn). We can now define the monotone realization h : |Γ| → Ki by
h(x)(ti) =

g1(ti) if ti ∈ E(xg1 , L) ∩ TLi ,
g2(ti) if ti ∈ [E(xg1 + xg2 , L) \ E(xg1 , L)] ∩ TLi ,
· · ·
gn(ti) if ti ∈ [E(1, L) \ E(
∑n−1
k=1 xgk , L)] ∩ TLi .
That the function h is continuous follows from the Pasting Lemma and the fact that
the distribution of bidders’ types is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. The next lemma establishes that h is a local monotone realization.
Lemma C.10. The monotone realization h is local.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas C.8 and B.3. □
All that is left to show is that the best response correspondence satisfies the condi-
tions required by Theorem 4.1. We denote by Vi(b | ti, β−i) bidder i’s interim payoff,
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given by






fj(tj) d t−i .
Lemma C.11. Fix a bid profile β−i ∈ K−i of players other than i. If Bi(β−i) is
bidder i’s best response to β−i, then Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is nonempty and order-convex.
Proof. Fix a profile β−i of bids for players other than i. We first show that the
intersection Bi(β−i) ∩ Ki is not empty. Let Bi denote the interim best response
correspondence, defined by
Bi(β−i | ti) = argmax
b∈B
Vi(b | ti, β−i) ,
and consider the selection gi(ti) = ∨Bi(β−i | ti). It is well-defined because B is finite.
Moreover, it is measurable because the pointwise partial order is measurable.
Suppose ti, t′i ∈ TLi are such that tiℓ ≥ t′iℓ for ℓ ∈ L and tiℓ ≤ t′iℓ for ℓ /∈ L. It suffices
to show that if b ≤ b′ and b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti) and b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i), then b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | ti).
Vi(b
′ | ti, β−i)− Vi(b | ti, β−i) =∫
[ρi(b








′ − ρi(b, β−i(t−i)b]
∏
j ̸=i
fj(tj) d t−i .
Since vi(ti, t−i) ≥ vi(ti, t−i) for every t−i and ρi(b′, β−i(t−i)) − ρi(b, β−i(t−i)) ≥ 0, it
follows that
Vi(b
′ | ti, β−i)− Vi(b | ti, β−i) ≥∫
[ρi(b








′ − ρi(b, β−i(t−i)b]
∏
j ̸=i
fj(tj) d t−i .
Therefore,
Vi(b
′ | ti, β−i)− Vi(b | ti, β−i) ≥ Vi(b′ | t′i, β−i)− Vi(b | t′i, β−i) ≥ 0 .
Because b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), it follows that b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | ti).
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Since the intersection Bi(β−i) ∩ Ki is a closed subset of Ki that is closed with
respect to the hulling from Lemma C.9 and with respect to the monotone realization
h from Lemma C.10, it follows that Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is order-convex. □
Therefore, by Theorem 4.1, this auction has an equilibrium in K.
C.3. First-price auction of imperfect substitutes. Fix a bidder i. To define the
bidder-specific set of strategies Ki, first partition the set of types [0, 1]2 above and
below the diagonal. That is, let [0, 1]2 = T 1i ∪ T 2i , where
T 1i = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : tA ≥ tB} ,
and
T 2i = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : tA < tB} .
Define Ki to be the set of measurable functions βi : [0, 1]2 → B that satisfy the
following requirement:
(⋆) For every pair of types ti, t′i ∈ T ki , with k = 1, 2, if tAi ≥ t′Ai and tBi ≤ t′Bi , then
βi(ti)
A ≥ βi(t′i)A and βi(ti)B ≤ βi(t′i)B.
We consider Ki to be a subset of the set of (equivalence classes of) measurable
functions over [0, 1]2 under the L1-norm topology. We next show that the subset Ki
is compact.
Lemma C.12. The set Ki is is L1-norm compact.
Proof. When restricted to each T ki , k = 1, 2, the set of functions in Ki satisfies the
assumptions of Lemmas A.10–A.12 in Reny (2011, pp. 538–540), but with mixed
monotonicity in the individual variables. Therefore, the desired result follows. □
Consider the partial order ≥i on Ki whereby g ≥i f whenever for almost every
ti ∈ T 1i
g(ti)
A ≥ f(ti)A and g(ti)B ≤ f(ti)B ,
and for almost every ti ∈ T 2i
g(ti)
A ≤ f(ti)A and g(ti)B ≥ f(ti)B .
Under this partial order, the set Ki is locally complete, as the following lemma es-
tablishes.
Lemma C.13. The partially ordered set (Ki,≥i) is locally complete.
Proof. The proof follows closely the proof of Lemma C.8, and is thus omitted. □
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Let Hi denote the collection of all finite subsemilattices of Ki according to the
partial order ≥i. The next lemma establishes that Hi is a small hulling.
Lemma C.14. The collection Hi of all finite subsemilattices of Ki under ≥i is a
small hulling.
Proof. The desired result follows from an application of Lemmas C.13 and B.1. □
Finally, we define a monotone realization for Ki. Recall that a monotone realization
is a continuous function h : |Γ| → Ki, from order simplexes in Γ to Ki. If Y ∈ Γ is
a simplex in the order complex of Ki, then Y consists of a finite chain in Ki. Thus
the elements in Y can be identified with the ordered vector Y = (g1, . . . , gn), with
g1 ≤i · · · ≤i gn. And a point x in the geometric realization |Y | can be written as
x = (xg1 , xg2 , . . . , xgn). Define the monotone realization h : |Γ| → Ki by
h(x)(ti) =

g1(ti) if |tBi − tAi | ≤ xg1 ,




ℓ<n xgℓ < |tBi − tAi | ≤ 1 .
The mapping h will be a piecewise combination of strategies in a chain. For the
case when Y = (g1, g2), Figure 3 illustrates, for three different points in the geometric
realization |Y |, the parts in the domain Ti where h is equal to g1 or g2. Figure 3a
shows the composition of h at the point δg1 = (1, 0) that puts all weight into strategy
g1, in which case h(δg1) = g1. Figure 3b shows the composition of h at a point
αδg1 + (1− α)δg2 = (α, 1− α), α ∈ (0, 1), that puts some weight into strategy g1 and
some into strategy g2. In this case
h(αδg1 + (1− α)δg2)(ti) =
g1(ti) if |tBi − tAi | ≤ α ,g2(ti) if |tBi − tAi | > α .
Notice that, since g1 ≤i g2, if tAi ≥ tBi , then gA1 (ti) ≤ gA2 (ti) and gB1 (ti) ≥ gB2 (ti).
Similarly, if tAi ≤ tBi , then gA1 (ti) ≥ gA2 (ti) and gB1 (ti) ≤ gB2 (ti). Therefore, h(αδg1 +
(1−α)δg2) ∈ Ki. Finally, Figure 3c shows the composition of h at the point δg2 = (0, 1)
that puts all weight into strategy g2, in which case h(δg2) = g2.
That the function h is continuous follows from the Pasting Lemma and the fact that
the distribution of bidders types is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. The next lemma establishes that h is a local monotone realization.





















(c) h(δg2) = g2
Figure 3. Piecewise composition of the monotone realization h(|(g1, g2)|)
Lemma C.15. The monotone realization h is local.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas C.13 and B.3. □
Together, Lemmas C.14 and C.15 imply that Ki is order-convex, which is recorded
in the following corollary.
Corollary C.16. The set Ki is an order-convex subset of strategies of bidder i.
The remaining lemmas establish that the best response correspondence satisfies the
assumptions of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma C.17. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and a type ti ∈ [0, 1]2
of bidder i. Let Bi(β−i | ti) be bidder i’s interim best response to β−i when her type
is ti. Then the following are true:
(1) If ti ∈ T 1i and b, d ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), then (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) ∈ Bi(β−i | ti).
(2) If ti ∈ T 2i and b, d ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), then (bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB) ∈ Bi(β−i | ti).
Proof. (1) Suppose ti ∈ T 1i and b, d ∈ Bi(β−i | ti). Let π(S, b) denote the proba-







fj(tj) d t−i .
If W (b) =
∑
S⊆{A,B} vi(S, ti)π(S, b), then
W (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) +W (bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB)−W (b)−W (d)
= tBi [π(B, b
A ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) + π(B, bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB)− π(B, b)− π(B, d)]
≥ 0 .
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Since b, d ∈ Bi(β−i | ti),
W (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) +W (bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB)−W (b)−W (d) ≥ 0
implies that (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), which completes the proof.
(2) A similar argument, with the roles of A and B reversed, proves (2).
□
Lemma C.18. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and let Bi(β−i) be
bidder i’s ex ante best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is nonempty.
Proof. Recall that Bi(β−i | ti) is the interim best response correspondence, defined
by
Bi(β−i | ti) = argmax
b∈B
Vi(b | ti, β−i) ,
and consider the selection
gi(ti) =
(∨Bi(β−i | ti)|A,∧Bi(β−i | ti)|B) if ti ∈ T 1i(∧Bi(β−i | ti)|A,∨Bi(β−i | ti)|B) if ti ∈ T 2i
It is well-defined by Lemma C.17 and because B is finite. Moreover, it is measurable
because the pointwise partial order is measurable.
Suppose ti, t′i ∈ T 1i are such that tAi ≥ t′Ai and tBi ≤ t′Bi . It suffices to show that if
b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti) and b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i), then (bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B) ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i).
Vi(b
A ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B | t′i, β−i)− Vi(b′ | t′i, β−i)
= t′Ai [π(AB ∪ A, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(AB ∪ A, b′)] + t′Bi [π(B, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(B, b′)]
≥ tAi [π(AB ∪ A, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(AB ∪ A, b′)] + tBi [π(B, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(B, b′)]
= Vi(b
A ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B | ti, β−i)− Vi(b′ | ti, β−i) .
By the same argument as in Lemma C.17, it follows that
Vi(b
A∨b′A, bB∧b′B | ti, β−i)−Vi(b′ | ti, β−i)−Vi(b | ti, β−i)+Vi(bA∧b′A, bB∨b′B | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 .
Because b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), it follows that
Vi(b
A ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B | ti, β−i)− Vi(b′ | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
and thus b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i).
If ti, t′i ∈ T 2i , then a similar argument, with the roles of A and B reversed, completes
the proof. □
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Lemma C.19. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and let Bi(β−i) be
bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i)∩Ki is closed with respect to
the hulling Hi.
Proof. The desired result follows from Lemmas C.17 and C.18. □
Lemma C.20. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and let Bi(β−i) be
bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i)∩Ki is closed with respect to
the monotone realization h.
Proof. The result follows from the construction of the monotone realization. □
Together, Lemmas C.18-C.20 imply the following corollary, which allows us to apply
Theorem 4.1 to show that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in K.
Corollary C.21. Fix a profile β−i ∈ K−i of bids of players other than i and let
Bi(β−i) be bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i)∩Ki is non-empty
and order-convex.
Appendix D. Proofs for Section 6
D.1. Proof of Theorem 6.1. For convenience, we repeat the assumptions made in
Section 6:
(1) Each player i’s type space Ti = [τ i, τ i]Mi × [τ i, τ i]M
′
i is a nondegenerate Eu-
clidean cube, with the coordinate-wise partial order.
(2) Each player i’s types are distributed according to the probability density fi
over Ti, not necessarily everywhere positive, but independently of other play-
ers’ types.
(3) Each player i’s set of actions Ai = [αi, αi]Ni × [αi, αi]N
′
i is an Euclidean cube,
endowed with the coordinate-wise partial order.
(4) Each player i’s payoff function ui : A × T → R is bounded, measurable in t,
and continuous in a.
In addition, Theorem 6.1 makes the following assumptions on each player i’s payoff
function ui : A× T → R.
(a) Take any given a−i ∈ A−i and t ∈ T . If a, a′ ∈ Ai, then
ui(a, a−i; t)− ui((aNi ∧ a′Ni , aN ′i ∨ a
′
N ′i
), a−i; t) ≥ 0
⇒ ui((aNi ∨ a′Ni , aN ′i ∧ a
′
N ′i
), a−i; t)− ui(a′, a−i; t) ≥ 0 .
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(b) Take any given a−i ∈ A−i and t−i ∈ T−i. Suppose ai, a′i ∈ Ai are such that
aik ≥ a′ik for k ∈ Ni and aik ≤ a′ik for k ∈ N ′i ; and ti, t′i ∈ Ti are such that
tiℓ ≥ t′iℓ for ℓ ∈ Mi and tiℓ ≤ t′iℓ for ℓ ∈ M ′i , then
ui(ai, a−i; t
′
i, t−i)− ui(a′i, a−i; t′i, t−i) ≥ 0
⇒ ui(ai, a−i; ti, t−i)− ui(a′i, a−i; ti, t−i) ≥ 0 .
With these assumptions in mind, we can now prove Theorem 6.1. Take any player i.
Define Ki to be the set of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions si from Ti =
[τ , τ ]Mi × [τ , τ ]M ′i to Ai = [α, α]Ni × [α, α]N
′
i that satisfy two conditions:
(1) If k ∈ Ni, then ti 7→ sik(ti) is nondecreasing in tiℓ whenever ℓ ∈ Mi, and
nonincreasing in tiℓ whenever ℓ ∈ M ′i .
(2) If k ∈ N ′i , then ti 7→ sik(ti) is nonincreasing in tiℓ whenever ℓ ∈ Mi, and
nondecreasing in tiℓ whenever ℓ ∈ M ′i .
Endow Ki with the L1-norm topology. Partially order Ki by the almost everywhere
pointwise order ≥i whereby gi ≥i g′i if and only if for µi-almost every ti
gik(ti) ≥ g′ik(ti) if k ∈ Ni , and
gik(ti) ≤ g′ik(ti) if k ∈ N ′i ,
where gik(ti) denotes the projection of the vector gi(ti) onto the k-th coordinate of
the action space Ai = [α, α]Ni × [α, α]N
′
i .
Lemma D.1. The set Ki is L1-norm compact and locally complete.
Proof. The set Ki is homomorphic and lattice isomorphic16 to the set of monotone
functions from Ti to Ai. By Lemma A.13 in Reny (2011, p. 540), Ki is compact. By
Lemma 7.2, the set Ki is locally complete. □
Let Hi denote the collection of all finite subsemilattices of (Ki,≥i). The next
lemma shows that Hi is a small hulling.
Lemma D.2. The collection Hi of all finite subsemilattices of (Ki,≥i) is a small
hulling.
Proof. It follows from Lemmas D.1 and B.1. □
Finally, we define a monotone realization for Ki. Recall that a monotone realization
is a continuous function h : |Γ| → Ki from order simplexes in Γ to Ki. Let 1M denote
16If (X,∨,∧) and (X ′,∨,∧) are lattices, then a lattice isomorphism is a bijective mapping κ : X → X ′
such that κ(x ∨ y) = κ(x) ∨ κ(y) and κ(x ∧ y) = κ(x) ∧ κ(y).
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the indicator vector, in which the ℓ-th entry is 1 if ℓ ∈ M or 0 if ℓ /∈ M . Notice that
1M · 1M denotes the number of non-zero entries in M , with M = Mi,M ′i . For every
c ∈ [0, 1], define the following measurable set of player i’s types:
E(c) = {ti ∈ Ti : (1Mi − 1M ′i ) · ti ≤ (1− c)(τ − τ)(1Mi · 1Mi) + c(τ − τ)(1M ′i · 1M ′i )} .
Notice that the collection {E(c) : c ∈ [0, 1]} is an increasing chain of measurable
subsets of bidder i’s type space that reflects the ordering induced by the natural order
of [τ , τ ]Mi and the dual order of [τ , τ ]M ′i . Further, notice that E(0) is a singleton, and
E(1) = Ti.
If Y ∈ Γ is a simplex in the order complex of Ki, then Y consists of a finite chain in
Ki. Thus the elements in Y can be identified with the ordered vector Y = (g1, . . . , gn),
with g1 ≤i · · · ≤i gn. And a point x in the geometric realization |Y | can be written




g1(ti) if ti ∈ E(xg1) ,
g2(ti) if ti ∈ E(xg1 + xg2) \ E(xg1) ,
· · ·
gn(ti) if ti ∈ E(1) \ E(
∑n−1
k=1 xgk) .
That the function h is continuous follows from the Pasting Lemma and the fact that
the distribution of players’ types is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. The next lemma establishes that h is a local monotone realization.
Lemma D.3. The monotone realization h is local.
Proof. The desired result follows from an application of Lemmas D.1 and B.3. □
Together, Lemmas D.2 and D.3 imply that Ki is order-convex, which is recorded
in the following corollary.
Corollary D.4. The set (Ki,≥i) is an order-convex subset of strategies of player i.
Assumptions (1)–(4) imply that Assumptions A.1 and A.2 are satisfied. All that is
left to show is that the best response correspondence satisfies the conditions required
by Theorem 4.1. We denote by Vi(a | ti, s−i) player i’s interim payoff, given by






fj(tj) d t−i .
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Lemma D.5. Fix a profile s−i of strategies of players other than i and a type ti ∈ Ti
of bidder i. Let Bi(s−i | ti) be bidder i’s interim best response to s−i when her type is
ti. If a, b ∈ Bi(s−i | ti), then (aNi ∨ bNi , aN ′i ∧ bN ′i ) ∈ Bi(s−i | ti).
Proof. Suppose a, b ∈ Bi(s−i | ti). By Assumption (a) of Theorem 6.1,
Vi(b | ti, s−i)− Vi(aNi ∧ bNi , aN ′i ∨ bN ′i | ti, s−i) ≥ 0
implies that
Vi(aNi ∨ bNi , aN ′i ∧ bN ′i | ti, s−i)− Vi(a | ti, s−i) ≥ 0 .
Since a, b ∈ Bi(s−i | ti), it follows that (aNi ∨ bNi , aN ′i ∧ bN ′i ) ∈ Bi(s−i | ti), which
completes the proof. □
Lemma D.6. Fix a profile s−i of strategies of players other than i and let Bi(s−i) be
player i’s best response to s−i. The intersection Bi(s−i) ∩Ki is nonempty.
Proof. Consider the following selection of the interim best-response Bi(s−i | ti) of
player i given her type ti and strategies of other players s−i:
gi(ti) = {(∨aNi ,∧aN ′i ) : a ∈ Bi(s−i | ti)} .
It is well-defined because Ai is a compact sublattice of RNi∪N
′
i . Moreover, it is mea-
surable because the pointwise partial order is measurable.
Suppose ti, t′i ∈ Ti are such that tiℓ ≥ t′iℓ for every ℓ ∈ Mi and tiℓ ≤ t′iℓ for every
ℓ ∈ M ′i . It suffices to show that if a ∈ Bi(s−i | ti) and b ∈ Bi(s−i | t′i), then
(aNi ∨ bNi , aN ′i ∧ bN ′i ) ∈ Bi(s−i | ti). Since b ∈ Bi(s−i | t
′
i),
Vi(b | t′i, s−i)− Vi(aNi ∧ bNi , aN ′i ∨ bN ′i | t
′
i, s−i) ≥ 0 .
By Assumption (b) of Theorem 6.1,
Vi(aNi ∨ bNi , aN ′i ∧ bN ′i | ti, s−i)− Vi(a | ti, s−i) ≥ 0 .
Since a ∈ Bi(s−i | ti), it follows that (aNi ∨ bNi , aN ′i ∧ bN ′i ) ∈ Bi(s−i | ti), which
completes the proof. □
Lemma D.7. Fix a profile s−i of strategies of players other than i and let Bi(s−i) be
player i’s best response to s−i. The intersection Bi(s−i)∩Ki is closed with respect to
the hulling Hi.
Proof. The desired result follows from Lemmas D.5 and D.6. □
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Lemma D.8. Fix a profile s−i of strategies of players other than i and let Bi(s−i) be
player i’s best response to s−i. The intersection Bi(s−i)∩Ki is closed with respect to
the monotone realization h.
Proof. This follows from the construction of the monotone realization. □
Together, Lemmas D.6-D.8 imply the following corollary, which allows us to apply
Theorem 4.1 to show that this Bayesian game has an equilibrium in K.
Corollary D.9. Fix a profile s−i ∈ K−i of strategies of players other than i and let
Bi(s−i) be player i’s best response to s−i. The intersection Bi(s−i) ∩Ki is nonempty
and order-convex.
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